[Markets] I've been thinking about...

... gloom, boom and doom in the new reality

Dr Marc Faber Publisher & Editor | The Gloom, Boom and Doom Report |



Dr Marc Faber 2009 Presentation for Portfolio Construction Conference 17.00, Wednesday 26 August 2009 Australian Technology Park, Sydney Australia

COULD EXPANSIONARY MONETARY POLICIES AND LARGE DEFICITS LEAD TO HIGH INFLATION RATES?

Marc Faber Limited Suite 3311-3313 Two International Finance Centre 8 Finance Street Central Hong Kong Tel: (852) 2801-5411 Fax: (852) 2845-9192 Email: faberdoom@yahoo.com "Give me control of a nation's money and I care not who makes the laws"

- Amschel Rothschild

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

The world is in the midst of the worst economic slump since the Great Depression. Economic policy responses were unprecedented coordinated fiscal and monetary measures. Will they help or aggravate and prolong the crisis? How long will it take for the world to return to peak economic activity of 2006/2007?


Paul Krugman: "To be honest, a new bubble now would help us out a lot even if we paid for it later. This is a really good time for a bubble." **But does the world really need another "new bubble"?**

Between 2002 and 2007 all assets including real estate, equities, commodities, bond, and art prices increased in value while the US dollar depreciated.

Assuming there was a "new bubble", which asset would be the most likely candidate?

The inflation-deflation debate is intensifying. Why prolonged deflation is most unlikely!

HOW ARTIFICIALLY LOW INTEREST RATES CAUSED THE CRISIS!




Fed Fund Rate remained at 1% until June 2004

EASY MONEY EXACERBATES VOLATILITY




* Includes cattle, cocoa, coffee, copper, corn, cotton, crude oil, gold, heating oil, hogs, lumber, oats, orange juice, platinum, pork bellies, silver, soybeans, soybean meal, soybean oil, sugar, and wheat.


WEST TEXAS INTERMEDIATE CRUDE OIL PRICE




U.S. DEBT RATIOS HAVE BEEN PUSHED HIGHER BY REFLATION




EACH CRISIS PRODUCED MORE MONETARY EASING AND HIGHER STOCK PRICES! BUT WILL IT WORK THIS AND NEXT TIME?




10 YEAR U.S. TREASURY CONSTANT MATURITY (Monthly)




FROM THE ILLUSION OF WEALTH TO TOTAL WEALTH DESTRUCTION, 1997 - 2009



WORLD STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION: FROM \$63 TRILLION TO \$28 TRILLION!




GLOBAL COLLAPSE IN HOME PRICES – NEXT SHOE TO DROP: COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE




CREDIT GROWTH COLLAPSES AS LENDING STANDARDS TIGHTEN

Total New Borrowing by Households and Non-Financial Business % PGDP


Lending Standards Tighten






Source: Bridgewater Associates, Goldman Sachs

THE U.S. TREASURY'S ATTEMPT TO STIMULATE CREDIT GROWTH IS LIKELY TO FAIL




EASY MONEY MAY BOOST ASSET PRICES




Source: Ed Yardeni; www.yardeni.com


TOTAL MARKET CAPITALIZATION (NYSE) AS A PERCENTAGE OF NOMINAL GDP, 1924-2009



TRADE BALANCE (TOTAL), 1960-2009



U.S. OVERCONSUMPTION STIMULATED THE CHINESE ECONOMY, LIFTED COMMODITY PRICES, AND ENRICHED RESOURCE PRODUCERS




World Crude Oil Outlays, 1996-2009

- * Total world daily crude oil demand multiplied by 365 days and by the US average import crude oil price.
- ** 12-month forward consensus expected operating earnings per share. Time-weighted average of current and next year's consensus earnings estimates.


Source: Ed Yardeni; www.yardeni.com


FIRST SYNCHRONIZED GLOBAL BOOM AND BUST IN 200 YEARS OF CAPITALISM BUT...

Global economy has become more synchronized



Risk Premiums remained low for too long!







In 2006/2007: only one country in recession – money-printing Zimbabwe!

... A NEW WORLD HAS EMERGED

Monthly Motor Vehicles Sold (million units)




GROWTH IN U.S. TRADE AND CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT LED TO INCREASING INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND A WEAK U.S. DOLLAR




Strong inverse correlation between the growth rate in International Reserves and the U.S. dollar!

SLOW-DOWN IN GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES TIGHTEN GLOBAL LIQUIDITY




FROM NOW ON FASTER GROWTH IN EMERGING ECONOMIES




Source: Barry Bannister, Stifel Nicolaus & Co; Goldman Sachs

PER CAPITA GDP (IN 1960 U.S. DOLLARS)




Rising wealth inequality between the MDCs and the LDCs over the last 250 years has reversed for good!

CHINESE YUAN, 1982-2009





AUSTRALIAN DOLLAR, 2001-2009



Source: Ed Yardeni; www.yardeni.com


NO PROPERTY BUBBLE IN CHINA!






Source: The Bank Credit Analyst


URBANIZATION IN ASIA




FOR WHICH COMMODITIES WILL DEMAND NOT COLLAPSE?




A MASSIVE INCREASE IN RESOURCE-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES WHILE THE ECONOMY IS UNDER LEVERAGED




OIL CONSUMPTION DURING PHASES OF INDUSTRIALISATION



CRUDE OIL DEMAND IN CHINA AND INDIA AND ANNUAL CHANGE, 1987-2009




PAST AND FUTURE OIL DISCOVERIES (in billions of barrels per year)



THE GEOPOLITICS OF OIL


Map of Iran



Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection

Source: The Bank Credit Analyst

THE GEOPOLITICS OF OIL IN ASIA: THE CONTROL OF SEA LANES




THE SCO INCLUDES CHINA, RUSSIA, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN



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
Source: 1999 MAGELLAN Geographixsm, (805) 685-3100: www.maps.com

RISING COMMODITY PRICES LEAD TO INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS – WARS LEAD TO SOARING PRICES




Source: US Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Legg Mason Format

COMMODITY PRICES IN REAL TERMS, 1800 - 2009




ZERO HOUR! 1954-2009

Zero-Hour 2015? Diminishing U.S. GDP Returns from Each \$1 of New Nonfinancial U.S. Debt, 1Q 1954 to 4Q 2008 (*Not* smoothed)




A FINANCIAL SECTOR EARNINGS BUBBLE




From 1990-2007, financial sector earnings up 5 times. Non-financial sector earnings up 100%

DECLINING PERSONAL SAVING RATE TURBOCHARGED THE ECONOMY AND CORPORATE PROFITS




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Merrill Lynch

THE COMING COLLAPSE IN CAPITAL SPENDING




DURABLE GOODS ORDERS AND S&P 500 EARNINGS, 1968-2009




www.gloomboomdoom.com

Source: The Bank Credit Analyst


U.S. STOCK MARKET 10-YEAR COMPOUND ANNUAL TOTAL RETURN 1827-2009



STILL TOO MUCH SPECULATION!




DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE, 1885-2009 (Monthly – Adjusted for inflation by the CPI – All items)



Source: Ron Griess; www.thechartstore.com


HOURS OF WORK NEEDED TO BUY THE S&P 500 1969-2009



MOVEMENT OF MEXICAN STOCKS IN PESO AND USD, 1979-1988


	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
High	1,651	1,432	1,479	796	2,452	4,366	11,197	47,101	343,545	178,456 (Feb
Low	1,066	1,107	862	496	837	2,885	3,710	12,802	60,281	139,620
Table 2	ligh/Low of	Mexican S	Stock Exc	hange Inc	lex (US\$)	, 1979–1	988			
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
High	70	62	63	29	15	24	25	51	220	77 (Feb
Low	48	48	34	5	5	16	16	25	47	62
Table 3	Mexican Fun 1979	d Net Ass 1980	et Value (1981	US\$), 19 1982	79– 1 988 1983	1984	1985	198	6 198	7 1988
		10.00	3.30	1.72	2.88	2.95	3.53	9.84		

MEXICAN PESO, 1969-2009 (Monthly Spot – Pesos per USD)




Source: Ron Griess, www.thechartstore.com

DOW TO GOLD RATIO, 1800-2009




WORSENING EXTERNAL POSITION OF THE U.S.: U.S. NET BALANCE OF ASSETS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 1960-2009




Source: Bridgewater Associates


U.S. DOLLAR INDEX (DX), 1970-2009 (Monthly)



JAPAN: BOND YIELD AND DIVIDEND YIELD 1996-2008




NIKKEI 225, 1970-2009 (Monthly)



Source: Ron Griess, www.thechartstore.com

HANG SANG INDEX 1969-2009 (Monthly)



Source: Ron Griess, www.thechartstore.com

INVESTMENT THEMES

Real Estate in Emerging Economies :	Avoid real estate in financial sectors
Equities in Asia:	Major lows were established in October/November 2008
Healthcare in Asia:	Pharmaceutical, hospital management companies will benefit from an ageing population
Local Brands:	Will displace some international brands
Commodities:	Volatile, but uptrend intact. Corrections of 50% are common.
Tourism:	Hotels, casinos, airports, beach resorts. Potential problem is oversupply
Financial Services:	Banks, insurance companies, brokers, REITs in emerging economies
Infrastructure:	Bottlenecks everywhere. Potential problem could be cancellations

Investment Themes cont'd.

Plantations & Farmland :	Indonesia, Malaysia, Latin America, Ukraine		
Japan:	Very depressed, banks look interesting		
New Regions:	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Mongolia		
Gold and Silver:	Long		
U.S. Treasury Bonds:	Short		
Corporate Bonds :	Long		
Multinational Corporations: Highest quality companies will gain market share during next economic recovery			

CONCLUSIONS

The current synchronized global economic boom and the universal asset bubble, which lasted between 2002 and 2007, has led to a colossal bust.

The wealth destruction arising from falling asset prices is unprecedented post Second World War.

Expansionary monetary policies, which caused the current credit crisis, are the wrong medicine to solve the current problems. But, what options does the Fed have with a total credit market debt to GDP of 375%?

Central bankers have become hostage to inflated asset markets! Will tight money - whenever necessary - be implemented again?

A short-lived "crack-up" boom, driven by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, is a possibility. How sustainable will it be?

The current crisis has failed to clean up the system, and policy responses are the same as those applied post 2001.

The final crisis has yet to come! The economic, social and geopolitical clock will then be permanently reset.

There is no means of avoiding a final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as a result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved.

Ludwig von Mises

Investing in the new reality...

