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Just as China led the world in economic recovery in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, it is playing a similar role today. It is a bitter pill for many to swallow.

I foresee a 35% drop in the broad dollar index over the next two to three years. Covid-19 may have spread from China, but the Covid currency shock looks like it will be made in America.

The world economy was weak, and getting weaker, when COVID-19 struck - and it has brought the Chinese economy to a virtual standstill. China's sneeze may prove to be especially vexing for long-complacent financial markets.

The world economy is operating dangerously close to stall speed. Ever-present shocks and a sharply diminished trade cushion raise serious questions about financial markets' optimistic view of global economic prospects.

Trump's administration is flailing at antiquated perceptions of the Old China that only compound the problems it claims to be addressing. Financial markets are starting to get a sense that something is awry.

There is nothing unusual in a US President having a penchant for spin. But it won't be nearly as easy to spin the consequences of the flaws with Trump's economic policy.

Yes, the days of 10% Chinese growth are over. That was inevitable. But there are five key reasons to dismiss the now-widespread diagnosis that China is ensnared in the middle-income trap.

It was inevitable. Another upturn in the US inflation cycle is at hand. The Fed is entirely correct to send the message that there is considerably more to come in its current tightening cycle.

November 2018 will mark the tenth anniversary of quantitative easing - undoubtedly the boldest policy experiment in central banking modern history. There are five key lessons learned from QE.

Trump and team continue to flaunt virtually every principle of conventional economics. A trade war may well be an early skirmish in a much tougher battle, during which economics ultimately trumps Trump.

President Xi Jinping's political report, delivered on the opening day of China's latest Communist Party congress, was a high-impact event. Three conclusions from Xi's address are particularly important.

The Fed will not achieve balance-sheet normalisation until 2022-2023 at earliest. With more than $6tn of excess liquidity still sloshing around global financial markets, that's asking for trouble.

US President Donald Trump has once again raised the possibility of a trade conflict with China. Getting tough on China while ignoring the consequences could be a blunder of epic proportions.

Forecasters find it difficult to resist superimposing the outcomes in major crisis-battered developed economies on China. It has been the wrong approach in the past; it is wrong again today.

We ignore history at great peril. The latest disappointment for inflation-targeting central banks is really not a surprise after all.

China is upping the ante on its connection to an increasingly integrated world, running against the grain of the populist anti-globalisation backlash that is brewing in many developed countries.

The pendulum of world economic growth has swung - by 2018, the developing countries will have a greater share of world GDP (59%) than developed countries (41%). New? Absolutely. Normal? Not even close.

Another growth scare has come and gone for the Chinese economy. The near-term prognosis for the Chinese economy is far more encouraging than most had expected. China is actually making rapid progress on the road to rebalancing.

The lack of response at the zero bound of policy interest rates is hardly surprising. In fact, it is strikingly reminiscent of the so-called liquidity trap of the 1930s. What is particularly disconcerting is that central bankers remain largely in denial.

While seemingly elegant in theory, globalisation suffers in practice. That is the lesson of Brexit and of the rise of Donald Trump. Those who worship at the altar of free trade – including me – must come to grips with this glaring disconnect.